Man has always been a collector and presumably always will be one. In the dim ages of his beginnings, he collected food, shellfish, berries and nuts and in his tropical and sub-tropical haunts lived fairly securely through the little changing seasons. When he invaded the temperate regions, with their seasonal variations, he learned to his cost the rise and fall of the tides of food supply and, dreading winters’ want, practised a variety of methods to hoard his food gatherings until (...) the season of food a-plenty came round again. It was the same with the hunters, who, whatever their feasting at the close of a successful hunt, could not consume everything and, experiencing shortages and failures, began to put aside food to be kept. Extra supplies probably in time gave rise to barter of one thing for another more desired—the furrier skin, the sharper antler pick, the more beautifully finished hand-axe or adze. He who had reserves could face a famine, a lost pelt and a broken tool, and doubtless gained in stature and status among his fellows. What he had, he had to hold by strength or guile— or both in combination in himself, his family or his tribe. Hunting no doubt led to the elimination of competitors, who would lower the food supplies, and to the proclamation of hunting rights, just as, later on, occupation of land good for grazing or cultivation, would give rise to tribal or chieftain ownership—and to the unending battle for ownership, over other claimants. This is again collecting, though in another form. (shrink)

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty – often framed as “neurorights” in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines (...) on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions. (shrink)

In this article, I make the case for the continued relevance of Plato’s Timaeus. I begin by sketching Allan Bloom’s picture of the natural sciences today in The Closing of the American Mind, according to which the natural sciences are, objectionably, increasingly specialized and have ejected humans qua humans from their purview. I argue that Plato’s Timaeus, despite the falsity of virtually all of its scientific claims, provides a model for how we can pursue scientific questions in a comprehensive (...) way that stresses their connections to other disciplines, including the humanities, and that puts humanity qua humanity back in the picture. I then argue that being led by Plato’s philosophy to return humanity conceptually to the natural world can improve our thinking regarding climate change and other important environmental crises. (shrink)

This article examines the theory of recollection in Plato's Meno and attempts to unravel some long-standing puzzles about it. What are the prenatal objects of the soul's vision? What are the post-natal objects of the soul's recollection? What is innate in the Meno? Why does Socrates (prima facie) suggest that both knowledge and true opinion are innate? The article pays particular attention to the ana- prefix in the verbs aneuriskô, anakineô and analambanô, and suggests that they are used for two (...) distinct stages of recollection: a phenomenological stage of ‘finding again’ or ‘awakening’ our innate content, which Plato calls doxa, and an epistemic stage of ‘getting it back’ as epistêmê. Thinking of the verbs with this ‘back/again’ sense of the ana- prefix (instead of as ‘up’, in the common translation of analambanô as ‘take up’) allows us to understand why Plato would simultaneously imply that our souls had prenatal epistêmê, have post-natal innate true opinion and have the potential to analambanein epistêmê. He is not talking about ‘taking up’ epistêmê that he also calls doxa, but about ‘getting back’ the epistêmê we had prenatally. The article concludes with an examination of what this innate content is, suggesting that it is a type of ‘principle’ and ‘essential’ mental content. (shrink)

This article develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of corporate political involvement, as mediated not only by environmental factors but also by characteristics of the firm itself. Consistent with previous research, the authors examine how policy salience and the political, macroeconomic, and industry environments influence the level of a firm's involvement in politics. In addition, the authors' model takes into account such influences as corporate structure, resources, political experience, and stakeholder dependence.

Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people never (...) experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. (shrink)

This article examines inequality from a framework of justice that attends to the socially situated nature of market activity, including exchange. I argue that accounts of unsituated exchange—accounts of market exchange that abstract from social situations, such as philosopher Robert Nozick’s influential libertarian account of justice—overlook various factors that contribute to growing economic inequality in contemporary society. Analyses of market exchange must incorporate the role of “third parties” who play a role in shaping and/or who are affected by economic transactions. (...) The involvement of these additional parties, including the government and future generations, is not interference but, instead, an integral part of the economic and moral accounting of exchange. An approach to justice and inequality which embeds exchange within multiple dimensions of economy and society is needed; the latter part of this article traces such a socially situated approach. (shrink)

Contemporary policymakers, as their predecessors, continue to view nomadic people as a weak minority, and their way of life and raising livestock as a backward and inefficient paradigm. Wherever nomads are not the dominant group, the trend to settle them continues even today as in the past. This book describes the changes forced upon formerly nomadic groups and how they still attempt to maintain their traditional, social, and cultural practices in their new settings. The book deals with the several modes (...) of livelihood of these communities, including entrepreneurship, and demonstrates the impact of investment-oriented urbanization policies leading to eviction from ancestral lands, and hurdles for nomadic mobility, ultimately threatening their survival. The book illustrates how some groups like the Borana and the Maasai practice livelihood diversity and raise productive livestock, and how other groups migrate to urban centers in search of employment and remit money to family members left in the rural areas. The book aims to raise awareness among the research community, especially those who work on regional and demographic labor policies. It helps in understanding why society needs to help build business and livelihood strategies without harming the values of nomadic groups. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze some of the ethical dimensions of going private transactions (GPTs), wherein publicly traded firms are taken private. Financial theory suggests that efficiencies may be realized in these transactions such that outside shareholders are made better off. Empirical evidence supports this theory. We therefore argue that GPTs are not inherently exploitive or unethical. The issues of the fiduciary duty of corporate managers to shareholders and their obligations to non-shareholders are also explored.

IN THIS ESSAY I ENGAGE THE DEBATE AMONG THEOLOGIANS, PHILOSOphers, and economists on the proper role of self-interest in the pursuit of economic well-being. Often, neither economists' use of self-interest nor critics' rejection of it is carefully specified. I consider conditions under which acting in one's self-interest is theologically and morally proper. Specifically, I argue that for socioeconomically disadvantaged persons, increased exercise of self-interest should not be regarded as sinful but as a fitting expansion of agency and well-being. Contextual factors (...) of distribution and the quality of social relations must inform any analysis of self-interest. I introduce a theological perspective on self-interest within an egalitarian Christian framework and suggest ways in which this approach enables further theological and ethical reflection on the proper role of self-interest. (shrink)

This article seeks to answer why there are two different versions of Meno’s Paradox. I argue that the dilemma contained in Socrates’s version is a pre-existing puzzle, familiar to both Meno and Socrates before their discussion. The two versions of the paradox are thus different because Meno’s version is a mistaken attempt to remember the puzzle contained in Socrates’s version. Although Meno’s version is a mistaken attempt to state Socrates’s version, it is a philosophically richer puzzle that makes three interesting (...) points about inquiry and recognition. After arguing that Socrates’s version is unsound and that Meno’s version is an attempt to recollect or remember it, I analyze Meno’s version in detail. In closing, I consider the relationship between the notion of recognition, which figures prominently in Meno’s version, and the theory of recollection, suggesting that the latter may have arisen as an attempt to explain the origin of moral intuitions. (shrink)

Abstract: Plato’s theory of recollection is classically treated as an account of “concept-acquisition” or “concept-possession,” explaining how the mind is able to employ general concepts, despite the senses only perceiving particulars. Against this, recent scholars (esp. Dominic Scott) have argued that recollection is not necessary for ordinary reasoning. Recollection is not about ordinary concepts that humans use; rather, recollection is a rare, prototypically philosophic affair that is satisfied by becoming aware of Forms or principles associated with them, which most people (...) never experience. On this view, most people do not recollect. A third position accepts both views: there are two types of recollection in Plato, one concerned with ordinary cognition, and one concerned with philosophical awareness of the Forms. This paper argues for the narrow reading, focusing on the Phaedrus. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to question the established view that the orator M. Calidius was an Atticist. I propose to argue that the term ‘Atticist’ should be reserved for the coterie centring on Calvus, which attacked Cicero, and was attacked by him in Brutus and Orator, and that our evidence for the oratory of Calidius does not warrant the inference that he was in any way associated with, or a forerunner of, that coterie.

This essay critically examines economist and philosopher Amartya Sen's writings as a potential resource in religious ethicists' efforts to analyze discrimination against girls and women and to address their well-being and agency. Delineating how Sen's discussions of "missing women" and "gender and cooperative conflict" fit within his "capability approach" to economic and human development, the article explores how Sen's methodology employs empirical analysis toward normative ends. Those ends expand the capability of girls and women to function in all aspects of (...) their society. It concludes with a discussion of ways to engage Sen's work within religious ethics. (shrink)

This book sets Gaudda in historical context and develops a commentary that makes the meaning and significance of the Alatasaanti text clear. In the Alatasaanti , Gaudda uses terms made familiar by Buddhism in order to expound his Vedantic philosophy. It places him at the watershed between Mahayana Buddhism and Vedanta. Among the important issues discussed are Gaudda's radical doctrine of non-production (ajati), that is, the view that despite appearances nothing is ever actually brought into existence; his notion of the (...) illusory nature of sensory experience; his conviction that reality is "not two" (and certainly not more than two); his theory of knowledge; and the "touchless yoga" he hoped would dispel our illusions about ourselves and our world. His logic and the content of his arguments are examined critically. "This is a very useful and valuable work. The topic is a central one in Indian philosophy, yet not many books and none in recent times, have ventured to explore it. The author does a persuasive job, especially given the controversial nature of the topic. The book's chief merit is its clear and readable style. The format clearly elucidates the Ajativada of Gaudda through critical and historical introduction, summaries, translations and commentary. This is a work which will not only draw general readers who are interested in Indian philosophy but also serious scholars who are concerned about textual interpretations. The translation of the text is very well done, both in terms of readability and authenticity." -- Deen K. Chatterjee, University of Utah. (shrink)

This article considers six types of Platonic Innatism and compares them to the nativisms of early modern writers. I first dismiss a type of innatism similar to the target of the first book of Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding and then discuss four types of innatism that might be considered “live options” for the one Plato employs in his theory of recollection: a Kantian “constructivist” innatism, a Cartesian “dispositional” innatism, a Leibnizian “content” innatism, and a Malebranchian “transcendent” innatism. Finally, in (...) closing, I discuss “condition innatism”. Though this last position is frequently referenced in Platonic scholarship, I argue that the position is incoherent. (shrink)

Although the similarities between the trial of Socrates and the trial of Jesus have been discussed since the age of the Apologists, the same cannot be said about the anonymously written Trial of Maximus the Confessor and Plato’s Apology. My paper seeks to start this discussion. First I look at the historical context of each trial, finding that each was preceded by a rebellion that the accused was suspected of inciting. Then I summarize the Trial, noting numerous similarities between it (...) and the Apology. After this, I examine some of these similarities in detail. In particular, I show that the defense speeches of both Socrates and Maximus reveal a layer of duplicity endemic to the text: while both Socrates and Maximus appear to exonerate themselves, their defense speeches actually contain harsh mockeries of their accusers. Next, I elucidate the consanguinity between the defendants’ opposition to their cities’ god, whom they feel compelled to reject, and their introduction of new gods into their cities —a charge for which both defendants were tragically convicted. Finally, I examine the manner in which both figures play gadfly to their city. (shrink)

This article provides a rigorous defense of innate true belief in the Meno, to my knowledge, the first of its kind. While several commentators have proposed innate true belief in the past, the position has never been defended or explained in detail. Instead, the most thorough discussions of Plato’s innatism have opted for different innate objects. I defend my proposal against these recent alternatives by showing that the passages often thought to imply innate knowledge can arguably be better read in (...) other ways. I then argue that they should be so read, because of an “awareness condition” Plato had on knowledge at the time. (shrink)

Believing that there is still something to be said about the early history of clausulae in Latin prose, I set myself to trace the practice of the early orators, then that of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, accepting its conventional dating to 86–82 B.C., and lastly that of Cicero in De Inventione, assuming it to be roughly contemporary with the ad Herennium, and in his early speeches. But clausula-study itself, besides shedding light on the methods of composition used by the still (...) unidentifiable Auctor ad Herennium, cast doubts on the conventional dating of his work. I gave a brief outline of my conclusions in C.R., N.S. vi , 134–6.1 propose to attempt here a detailed justification of those relating to the date of the work, with a few modifications of some points. (shrink)

Extraterrestrial Altruism examines a basic assumption of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI): that extraterrestrials will be transmitting messages to us for our benefit. This question of whether extraterrestrials will be altruistic has become increasingly important in recent years as SETI scientists have begun contemplating transmissions from Earth to make contact. Technological civilizations that transmit signals for the benefit of others, but with no immediate gain for themselves, certainly seem to be altruistic. But does this make biological sense? Should we (...) expect altruism to evolve throughout the cosmos, or is this only wishful thinking? Is it dangerous to send messages to other worlds, as Stephen Hawking has suggested, or might humankind benefit from an exchange with intelligence elsewhere in the galaxy? Would extraterrestrial societies be based on different ethical principles, or would we see commonalities with Earthly notions of morality? Extraterrestrial Altruism explores these and related questions about the motivations of civilizations beyond Earth, providing new insights that are critical for SETI. Chapters are authored by leading scholars from diverse disciplines—anthropology, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, cosmology, engineering, history of science, law, philosophy, psychology, public policy, and sociology. The book is carefully edited by Douglas Vakoch, Director of Interstellar Message Composition at the SETI Institute and professor of clinical psychology at the California Institute of Integral Studies. The Foreword is by Frank Drake. This interdisciplinary book will benefit everybody trying to understand whether evolution and ethics are unique to Earth, or whether they are built into the fabric of the universe. (shrink)

This article argues that the analogical argument employed by Augustine in De Trinitate (the soul-God analogy) is formally identical to the analogical argument employed by Plato in the Republic (the city-soul analogy). The similarities between these two analogies, however, have received insufficient attention in the secondary literature. My goal is to fill this lacuna. I first provide a summary of the analogical methodology of these two works, and I then proceed to translate these two analogies into one analogical argument form, (...) showing that they are formally equivalent. I then differentiate these two analogies from other analogical arguments by focusing on their exploratory and programmatic character. This differentiation helps to capture the uniqueness of these two analogies, to understand their function, and, ultimately, to appreciate more fully the consonance between Augustine’s methodology and Plato’s. (shrink)

The multiplicity of deubiquitinating enzymes (DUBs) encoded by vertebrate genomes is partly attributable to whole genome duplication events that occurred early in chordate evolution. By surveying the literature for the largest family of DUBs (the ubiquitin-specific proteases), extensive functional redundancy for duplicated genes has been confirmed as opposed to singletons. Dramatically conflicting results have been reported for loss of function studies conducted through RNA interference as opposed to inactivating mutations, but the contradictory findings can be reconciled by a recently proposed (...) compensatory mechanism involving nonsense-mediated RNA degradation. Duplicated genes are often inactivated to become pseudogenes, and it is proposed that such is the fate of the USP15 gene of zebrafish, a commonly used model system. As it is reviewed here, these observations have implications not only for the interpretation of model system phenotypes but also for therapeutic interventions designed to target DUBs. (shrink)